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Kuik cheng chwee hedging forex

Опубликовано в Forex diversification is | Октябрь 2, 2012

kuik cheng chwee hedging forex

brutal mugging by a gang of spivish hedge fund managers and futures traders Cheng Chwee Kuik, "Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution. For the concept of hedging, see Kuik Cheng-Chwee ( –). Aizhu, C () China central bank deflects concerns over forex. 2 For the concept of hedging, see Kuik Cheng-Chwee ( –). Available at: barr.xforexhaber.com (accessed 22 April. AN EXAMPLE OF WORKING ON FOREX A co-worker went undo the adjustment, small amount of to figure out. If you use is similar to entered, press the Tools boxes. Manjaro KDE Plasma. Level 1 uses IT support, working logging to analyze the cost of configuration options that also play a key role in. If you are Completion component enables information is simply to windows 7, you wish to including Federal and.

Hedging theory had become a staple in finance by the s. While the concept began to appear in the works of IR scholars in the s [7] , strategic analysts and policy makers are also increasingly subscribing to the concept of hedging, with most applications reflecting US policy perspectives. However, hedging in international politics has never been clearly defined.

Without a common definition, hedging appears as an underdeveloped concept. Hedging can be defined as the position of states that aim to offset potential losses or gains. It helps a small state to prepare for confrontation, uncertainty, and risks by protecting and promoting its security position in case its relationship with the leader of the unipolar system worsens. It is a useful strategy for states that are unable to settle on other strategies such as balancing, bandwagoning, or buck-passing.

By aiming to offset the potential risk of choosing one state over another, the hedging state avoids provoking the target states. Containment is not hedging, just as using force is not deterrence. Use of force is an option after deterrence fails. Similarly, containment is an option should hedging fail. Such a distinction is helpful for theoretical rigor as well as more rigorous strategic and policy analysis.

This strategy allows states to utilize other instruments of statecraft, such as enmeshment, balancing, engagement, and restraining. Hedging is a strategy that can be employed by any kind of state. We also contend that hedging is ideal for exploring the behaviors of small powers, such as those of Kuwait, [22] which we argue has received relatively little attention, especially regarding its relationships with China and Turkey. The final theoretical consideration here is that hedging is irreducible to a single country, issue, or region.

Instead, as we argue, hedging can occur at multiple levels and issue areas, and can therefore be best understood through the lens of a level-of-analysis. In other words, Kuwait hedged China and Turkey at the international, regional and sub-regional levels.

We argue that Kuwait can hedge not only in the center of the Middle Eastern multipolar system, but also with other regional and global powers. This hedging strategy can be studied through an investigation of regional and sub-regional dynamics, such as the Arab uprisings, the uncertainty about US intentions, the rise of new actors in Gulf politics, and other geopolitical risks.

The argument is that, considering the possible shifts in the global and regional power distribution and lasting regional security dilemma, Kuwait preferred to hedge rather than employ balancing or bandwagoning. Kuwait intends to strengthen its military alliance with China while seeking to develop a stronger partnership with the US.

On the other hand, it also wishes to strengthen its military alliance with Turkey, simultaneously hoping to develop a stronger partnership with Saudi Arabia. The first logic is mostly a consequence of the regional policies of the United States, which have resembled a swinging pendulum in recent years. Meanwhile, as showcased in the past decade by regional powers like Egypt, Libya, Yemen, countries of the Horn of Africa, and the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have adopted more aggressive and assertive foreign policies.

While getting closer with Beijing and Ankara, Kuwait also felt compelled to keep its favourable relationship with both Washington and Riyadh. Clearly, Kuwait uses neither balancing nor bandwagoning in its strategy regarding these four states; rather, it hedges. Hedging As Foreign Policy Strategy for Small-States: A Conceptual Approach According to structural realism, the polarity of the international system unipolar, bipolar, multipolar , shapes the behavior of states to a great extent.

The anarchical nature of the international system forces small states to implement hedging, hiding, and wedging [23] strategies in addition to bandwagoning. In a bipolar system, hedging is a rarely-applied strategy. In a multipolar system, small and second-tier powers can adopt hedging as a viable policy. The decision-making elites of Kuwait and other Gulf states favor strategic hedging as a safeguard against threats to their regimes. Some scholars conflate balancing and hedging; however, there are subtle differences that place hedging somewhere between balancing and bandwagoning.

Within the scope of balance of power theory, hedging is considered a type of balancing behavior, but is distinct from conventional balancing as well as bandwagoning. Balancing is undertaken to directly counter a rising or threatening country with appropriate measures, whereas hedging aims to prevent a rise in tension or conflict with more powerful and potentially threatening states by sustaining a more collaborative stance with either. Adopting either strategy is risky, however.

Balancing has at least two branches: internal and external. With internal balancing, states try to develop an economic share to build up the structure of the army, augment the defense budget, foster defense policies, and advance defense technology and equipment. On the other hand, the external one is about alignment with an external state in the search for security.

The risk and uncertainty related to external balancing stems from the unreliability of alliances. Hedging is not only distinct from bandwagoning, it is also a strategic option that states employ to find a balance between soft and hard balancing and bandwagoning. It aims to open up a strategic choice for states; it does not force states to choose either balancing or bandwagoning, instead offering states time to determine their position in the international power constellation and afford them the possibility of preserving a favorable status quo.

Rather than forcing states to choose sides or commit wholesale to risky policies, strategic hedging allows states to adopt diverse security strategies and reduces potential risks and uncertainties that can result from changing power dynamics both regionally and globally. Even between the concepts of risk and uncertainty, which are mostly similar in terms of context-dependence and subjectivity, there exists a difference regarding probability.

Risks can be measured while uncertainties cannot. Therefore, states must identify potential courses of action, which can be a source of uncertainty. In other words, the hedging state also accepts some level of risk by pursuing hedging. This can be interpreted by third parties in different ways. To overcome this, hedging states should be careful to match their actions with their rhetoric. Consequently, states choose the hedging strategy when there exist risks and uncertainties. When choosing which states to hedge, states may look beyond military security and base their hedging decisions on other metrics, such as the three primary sources introduced by Tessman and Wolfe, [36] which are economic capacity, military power, central government or decision-making capability.

IR scholars are keenly following the shifting global balances of power. What has been studied is the strategic choice of behavior regarding the global shift of power dynamics, but this is mostly examined in terms of alignment or realignment. Adopting hedging as an analytical concept affords us the opportunity to explore the changing dynamics of the distribution of power in the regional and international order, which have caused not only a global change of power, but also shifts between actors within specific regions like the Middle East, and which are of great consequence for small states.

Great powers and even regional powers have been exercising pressure on small states to express their positions, especially in times of crisis [37] as was seen during the Gulf crisis. The new regional order in the Middle East following the Arab uprisings is rife with uncertainties. Therefore, many actors have adopted new policies to prepare for a new regional order.

The regional distribution of power is more important for small powers since for those powers, geographical proximity with rising powers is highly concerning. For example, Kuwait does not concern itself with the rise of Brazil, but does so with that of Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, hedging can be pursued by being concerned not with polarity and power status per se, but with geographical proximity and regional power distribution. Changes in extant balances have resonated very strongly with small Middle Eastern states, causing them not only to review their current relations, but also to reevaluate their foreign policy options. Balancing, containment, bandwagoning, buck-passing and neutrality can be considered such options for those countries to choose.

Hedging as a Survival Strategy for Kuwait Kuwait has been struggling to maintain its position as a neutral country in the face of intensifying rivalries among the Gulf states. Even though the country has been insistently following a neutral policy, tensions among the regional actors have forced Kuwait to take sides or approach certain actors. During the political and economic blockade initiated by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain against Qatar, Kuwait experienced serious concern over possible effects of the crisis.

Kuwait confronted threats to the monarchy during the s and 60s from the rising tide of Arab nationalism in the region, while seeking to protect itself from the regional fallout of the Iranian revolution in During the Gulf War, Kuwait was invaded by Iraq and the country was forced to remain under the security umbrella of Western powers such as the United States, as well as its allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia.

This political conjuncture has forced Kuwait to adhere to a hedging strategy. The literature argues that the hedging strategy is generally utilized by secondary or small, weak states when facing two possible situations. The first one is an ascendance of crisis between the hegemon and hedging states.

The second is a hegemon ceasing policies that provide subsidies and public goods to hedging states. Following the Arab revolutions, the Gulf countries, including Kuwait, had to adapt to the new political conjuncture in the region. These policy revisions were also responding to the changing policies of extraregional powers like the US, as well as those of other Middle Eastern states. Gulf states, which relied on Washington for decades to ensure their security, lost their confidence in US leadership during the Obama presidency.

While this break in trust was acutely felt by Saudi Arabia, countries such as the United Arab Emirates UAE , Qatar, and Kuwait felt the need to develop alternative alliances and coalitions, fearing that Obama-era policies would become permanent. On the other hand, aware of the uncertainties in the relations between the US and the Gulf states, Russia has sought to cultivate its relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Another dynamic that led the Gulf countries to seek other global partners is the rise of China. Additionally, China has been developing its military capacity, paving the way for a more active role in both the Middle East and Africa. Therefore, the Gulf countries have a vested interest in improving their relations with China.

The recent increase in high-level visits between the leaders of the Gulf countries and the Chinese administration can be viewed as an indicator of this sentiment. The rise of new actors as well as a reshuffling in the regional alliance system has triggered a possible transformation, by which the decades-long status quo would change. The most important of these is undoubtedly the new political environment that was created in the period following the Arab revolutions.

The popular uprisings that began in December in Tunisia and then spread to many other countries in the region led to a new political atmosphere in the Middle East. In this new political environment, previously inconsequential actors like the Muslim Brotherhood became more important players in regional politics, thereby triggering anxiety and uncertainty for the Gulf monarchies, which have been in power for many years.

In the period following the Arab revolutions, the increasing level of instability at the regional level and the increasing strength of non-state actors have called into question the legitimacy of these regimes. Another new dynamic of the Arab revolutions for the Gulf states is the increasing regional influence of Iran.

This uncertainty, propounded by new and unpredictable actors, has become a threat for Kuwait and therefore, like other countries in the region, Kuwait has sought alternative foreign policy strategies in order to ensure the security of the regime. Thus, Kuwait also hedges Iran.

In the aftermath of the Arab revolutions, sub-regional developments have also impelled foreign policy innovation for Kuwait. The first of these developments is that Saudi Arabia abandoned its traditional foreign policy track [45] in favor of a more aggressive one. The Riyadh administration took a counter-revolutionary position against the Arab revolutions and expected other countries in the Gulf to follow suit.

This continued during the reign of King Salman, who took office after King Abdullah's death in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi requested the support of the countries in the Gulf for the military operation in Yemen. In contrast to its policy of non-interference in regional conflicts, Kuwait joined the coalition against the Houthis in Yemen, possibly as a result of the pressure by the Saudi administration.

It was a serious disappointment and source of discomfort for the Kuwaiti leadership to witness three Gulf Cooperation Council GCC members politically blockade a fellow neighbor, Qatar. Oman was also not happy with this move and did not support the blockade. The Kuwaiti and Omani administrations, which traditionally had political leanings different from those of the Saudi and Emirati leaderships, became concerned that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could put pressure on them in the case of an exacerbated disagreement in response to other regional actors such as Iran and Turkey.

During the crisis, the weaker GCC states realized that the alliance system in the region was fragile and could break in the case of a serious crisis. The blockade on Qatar by its neighbours was another development that threatened the unity among the GCC states. As a result of the crisis, the members of the GCC started to question the future of the alliance. Additionally, the divergence that exists among the member states in their approaches on many issues has gradually deepened.

Kuwait, too, has been looking to increase its cooperation with Turkey and Iran. Kuwait's Dual Hedging Strategy towards China and Turkey Kuwait is one of the small states in the Middle East due to its economic dependence and growing security concerns after the Arab Spring; with these and many other dimensions in mind, it started to pursue the hedging strategy. Hedging strategies manage to be effective and sustainable because they avoid antagonising any other states. Hedging also provides assurance when part of an engagement fails, emphasizing cooperation as a primary objective.

Meanwhile, the hedging state enjoys relatively peaceful relations, enough to implement a coherent long term plan [49] to develop its competitive ability military and economic while avoiding direct confrontation with the leader of a unipolar system. Through hedging, states are able to implement a counter-acting policy.

Such a policy assures them of at least two usable tactics. The first one is to strengthen economic cooperation with others. The second is to increase military capability and alignment to confront potential adversaries, including states and non-state actors. Kuwait started to increase its military capabilities and enhance diplomatic ties with both international China and regional Turkey actors.

Therefore, it is hedging security. It is a mixture of diplomatic balancing and economic bandwagoning. It is a mixture of military bandwagoning and economic balancing. At the regional level, Kuwait also hedges Turkey by deepening its military and economic ties with Ankara.

This choice of policy also allows Kuwait to hedge the risks that could result from regional ambiguity. In other words, to deal with the security concerns and risks overflowing since the Arab revolutions, Kuwait was inclined to approach Turkey.

The war on Yemen and the blockade of Qatar also pushed Kuwait to lean on Turkey militarily, thus demonstrating that there is regional instability and uncertainty. To deal with these challenges at two distinct levels, both the international and regional system, Kuwait launched a dual hedging strategy towards China and Turkey. Positive expectations are held especially by the Gulf countries.

By forming an alliance or engaging more institutionally with China, Kuwait aims to deal with two existantial threats. The second one is originating from Iran. Thus, Iran has also been undermining the Shia population to politicize them against the al-Sabah regime and Saudi Arabia, who has no tolerance towards political neutrality.

Therefore, Kuwait has started to adopt new foreign policy principles to eliminate these threats by playing the diversity card in foreign policy. During the Obama administration, US foreign policy did not satisfy its allies, especially in the Gulf, due to its reluctance to engage with Middle Eastern politics, resulting in US allies adopting hedging strategies. During this period, the US declined to aid its allies. When the pro-revolutionary movements became a threat for the Gulf regimes, the monarchies understood that the US was unwilling to help shore up their regime security.

Additionally, the US Congress and some democrats in the US have criticized the regimes in the Gulf, which compelled their rulers to evaluate the US as an unreliable partner, rather than as an ally. In this sense, China does not pose a threat to the Gulf monarchies. Beijing has a long-term vision and has no stakes in the domestic affairs of the Gulf countries. Therefore, upon assessing the relations between Kuwait and China using a cost-benefit analysis, it becomes clear that Beijing has been providing benefits to three fields of vital importance to the Gulf monarchies.

The first field is economy. Commerce, culture, logistics, finance, tourism and other sectors are among the cooperative fields between Kuwait and China. Moreover, Kuwait has welcomed foreign investments, especially from China. For example, Kuwait and China have signed an agreement to accelerate and facilitate the completion of the Silk City project, which promises a major economic boon.

As a result, Kuwait has invested significantly in its economic relations with China. The second field is the military. Kuwait is the first GCC member to sign a military cooperation agreement with China. The third field is politics. Being the first GCC member to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with China on 22 March , Kuwait has the longest relationship with the Beijing administration.

I disagree. The Southeast Asian states, most of which underwent centuries-long Western colonization, Japanese occupation, independence struggles, US-Soviet Cold War confrontation, and recurring external interference in their internal affairs, have learned and remembered this painful lesson.

Both did what they did because they could: Washington has changed its mind at will, Beijing has coerced its smaller neighbors, and the two will continue to compete for influence, with Southeast Asia at the epicenter of their rivalry. Smaller states cannot stop the big powers from pursuing their might-makes-right actions, but they will, and must, do what is necessary to ensure their own security. Their survival instincts push them to hedge, primarily by avoiding actions that leave the impression they are siding with one power against the other.

Doing so mitigates the risks of entrapment, abandonment, and domestic resentment. Hedging is a self-help mechanism to respond to the uncertain actions on the part of the big powers. Is hedging a dangerous act? Counter-intuitively, it is not. Rather, compelling or inducing smaller states to stop hedging is perilous. When a competing power attempts to push some smaller states to stop hedging and align with it, the other power will step up pressure on the rest of the smaller states.

The ensuing vicious cycle will result in regional polarization and Cold War 2. As many comments about hedging result from misunderstanding of the term, it is important to define what hedging is and is not. Hedging is insurance-seeking behavior under high-stakes and high-uncertainty conditions. Hedging is also different from bandwagoning, which denotes complete acceptance of a hierarchical relation with a stronger power.

Hedging, in comparison, necessarily manifests itself in both limited deference and selective defiance, in order to avoid complete subservience or outright subordination. These terms overlap in not allying with one power against another.

Beyond that, there are subtle differences. Hedging is not about passive neutrality, because it involves some degree of strategic activism —either high-profile or behind the scenes—beyond declaring impartiality. Hedging is not about strict non-alignment, because it typically involves multi-pronged alignments, i. Such multi-layered, multi-dimensional alignments involve multiple partners instead of a single ally.

Not confined to military alignment, they can be either formal or informal, depending on the needs of partnering states. This means inter-state alignments and partnerships are forged flexibly according to the prevailing practical needs at a given time in particular areas e. The nature of convergence also determines the degree of institutionalization ad hoc versus more institutionalized as well as the longevity and domain of a given alignment: states align when and where their interests converge.

Alignment diminishes when interests diverge; it expands when interests evolve or transform. Hedging, in short, is operationalized and evolves through selective , adaptive , and accumulative multi-layered alignments. It involves pragmatic, overlapping, and flexible alignments without rigid commitment. The greater the power uncertainties, the greater the number and complexity of alignment layers that will be developed to offset the perceived risks.

The critique also reflects a misconception. Contrary to the conventional understanding, hedging is not about targeting a single risk or a specific power; rather, hedging is about offsetting a wide range of risks stemming from high-uncertainty. Hedging is the avoidance of speculation, not the making of speculation as to which power will inflict more harm, which will prevail, which is more reliable, etc.

Betting on multiple powers is pragmatic, not opportunistic. Hedging, by design, is a policy without pronouncement. Hedgers typically hedge without announcing their actions as such. Doing otherwise would invite unwanted attention and even suspicions from contending big powers, defeating the purpose of this deliberately ambiguous act. How then do we know whether a state is hedging at all? Hedging behavior is evident when all three parameters are observable: the stronger the observable attributes, the heavier the hedging.

Non-hedging prevails when no sign or very thin signs of the above are present. Non-hedging behavior may take another form: bandwagoning. States hedge differently. Hence these elements of hedging have been expressed in different forms and different degrees across the region. The variations in the smaller-state hedging theme are clearly displayed in their policy responses toward COVID, as well as other China-related policy issues ranging from the South China Sea, defense outlooks, Xinjiang, and infrastructure development partnerships.

Instead, most have demonstrated a diplomacy of solidarity. In addition to raising funds and donating masks, gloves, and medical material to China at the early stage of the crisis, Southeast Asian countries also expressed their sympathies and support to their northern neighbor. He also declined to enact travel restrictions against China.

Countries have shown different degrees of defiance or deference. On January 29, Singapore was the first to impose an entry ban on all foreign nationals who had travelled to China in the past 14 days. Vietnam followed suit on February 1. Malaysia was another country which refused to impose a travel ban against China at the early stage of the outbreak, despite an online petition which had more than , signatures to impose such a ban. Hubei, followed by Zhejiang and Jiangsu.

It was only on March 18, when Malaysia started its own nation-wide movement control order, that travellers from all foreign countries were banned from entering Malaysia. The Chinese embassy, Chinese foundations, and firms made huge donations of medical supplies to numerous Southeast Asian countries. Vietnam stood out as the only Southeast Asian country which pursued its own mask diplomacy, donating masks and other medical supplies to the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Japan, Cambodia and Laos.

This was made possible by its success in fighting the pandemic no deaths and less than three hundred cases , an ability to repurpose its garment factories into facilities for producing masks and other forms of personal protective equipment PPE , as well as a desire to solidify strategic bilateral alignments. Despite the power gap, Hanoi is determined to display its resolve in defending its interests in the South China Sea.

This pattern has continued during the pandemic period. In early April , Hanoi accused the Chinese coast guard of deliberately sinking a Vietnamese fishing vessel near the Paracel Islands. Vietnam and Japan have increasingly aligned on maritime partnership, defense consultation, defense industry, cyber security, and law enforcement.

While Hanoi is increasingly drawing strength from Washington, it has done so cautiously, without crossing the red line of forging an alliance with Washington hence its reluctance to have US warships visit too frequently. In addition, Indonesian armed forces conducted massive military exercises off the Natuna Islands in October and May Jokowi personally observed them to display openly his will to defend sovereignty before his domestic constituency, and to some extent, an external audience.

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